ScreamingFace credentials and identity
This page is an inventory of credential categories and trust relationships, not a secret-handling runbook. Values, record identifiers, tokens, private keys, and one-time outputs must never be copied into documentation, Git, task trackers, or chat.
Runtime secret path
flowchart LR
O[Authorized operator<br/>break-glass window]
K[Azure Key Vault]
E[External Secrets Operator]
S[Kubernetes Secret]
P[Named workload consumer]
O -->|mint or rotate| K
K --> E --> S --> P
Platform runtime credentials are minted under a controlled break-glass window, stored in Azure Key Vault, and materialized by External Secrets Operator. Helm secret generation is disabled; charts consume a named existing Secret.
Record names are generation-scoped so a new stack can receive new credentials without deleting the live generation. Deleting an ExternalSecret may also delete its owned Kubernetes Secret even when the provider-side value is retained, so generation changes are cutovers, not renames.
Credential and trust inventory
| Category | Consumer and purpose | Lifecycle rule |
|---|---|---|
| url4-cloud JWT signing secret | url4-cloud signs and verifies short-lived capability tickets | Rotate as a coordinated new generation; outstanding tickets become invalid |
| aigateway database password | aigateway and PostgreSQL authenticate their private connection | Rotate both consumers together and verify migration plus application access |
| aigateway JWT signing secret | aigateway token mode and internal auth support | Coordinated rotation; not the public edge identity |
| aigateway admin password | Administrative bootstrap | Revoke or rotate after authorized use |
| aigateway provisioning token | Profile/credential provisioning | Short operational lifetime; rotate or revoke after use |
| aigateway encryption master key | Encrypts provider credentials stored in PostgreSQL | Do not rotate in place; use only an application-supported re-encryption migration |
| Provider credentials | Per-user or approved profile records inside aigateway | Never place in Helm values or the platform Secret rail; enforce ownership and spend policy |
| Tunnel token | cloudflared connects the dedicated tunnel | Rotate through an overlapping tunnel cutover where possible |
| Cloudflare service identity | Non-interactive public checks | Provider-managed client credential; rotate/revoke after exposure and verify the replacement |
| Preview GitHub App private key | Argo polls pull requests and reads tenant charts | Add a new key, prove PR discovery and Git access, then revoke the old key |
| Azure federated identity | Tenant Actions pushes images to ACR | Trust relationship, not a stored Azure client secret; narrow subjects and role scope |
Identity is not one credential
The public application path combines distinct controls:
- Cloudflare Access authenticates a user or service at the public edge.
- Envoy re-verifies the Access assertion and removes forged reserved headers.
- Envoy injects the verified identity and platform-owned tenant marker.
- url4-cloud issues a separate 60-second capability ticket scoped to one run topic.
- aigateway maps a verified user email to an account and selects the requested profile; the profile selects a provider credential.
A capability ticket does not replace Cloudflare identity, and a Cloudflare service identity is not currently a valid aigateway user profile. Treating these as interchangeable can produce a transport-successful request that still cannot execute a model.
Ownership rules
- PULSE owns Key Vault records, ExternalSecrets, materialized runtime Secrets, and their chart mappings.
- ScreamingFace owns application behavior that consumes those keys and the schema for profile/provider credentials.
- Repository-level Azure identifiers are non-secret configuration owned jointly by the tenant CI and platform federation.
- The tenant application team owns who may receive a provider profile and what spend cap applies. That contract remains an open provider-completion gate.
- A secret reference may appear in Git; its value may not.
Rotation consequences
Before rotating, identify every consumer, whether overlap is supported, and what constitutes functional proof after cutover. Rotation is not complete because a Secret synchronized or a pod restarted.
Use overlapping-key rotation for systems that support it, including the GitHub App. Use generation-scoped records for application runtime credentials. The aigateway encryption master key is exceptional: replacing it without re-encrypting stored credential blobs makes those blobs unreadable.
Any credential that passes through an uncontrolled channel should be treated as exposed. Revoke or rotate it through the owning provider, then prove the new credential and the old credential's rejection without recording either value.