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ScreamingFace credentials and identity

This page is an inventory of credential categories and trust relationships, not a secret-handling runbook. Values, record identifiers, tokens, private keys, and one-time outputs must never be copied into documentation, Git, task trackers, or chat.

Runtime secret path

flowchart LR
    O[Authorized operator<br/>break-glass window]
    K[Azure Key Vault]
    E[External Secrets Operator]
    S[Kubernetes Secret]
    P[Named workload consumer]

    O -->|mint or rotate| K
    K --> E --> S --> P

Platform runtime credentials are minted under a controlled break-glass window, stored in Azure Key Vault, and materialized by External Secrets Operator. Helm secret generation is disabled; charts consume a named existing Secret.

Record names are generation-scoped so a new stack can receive new credentials without deleting the live generation. Deleting an ExternalSecret may also delete its owned Kubernetes Secret even when the provider-side value is retained, so generation changes are cutovers, not renames.

Credential and trust inventory

Category Consumer and purpose Lifecycle rule
url4-cloud JWT signing secret url4-cloud signs and verifies short-lived capability tickets Rotate as a coordinated new generation; outstanding tickets become invalid
aigateway database password aigateway and PostgreSQL authenticate their private connection Rotate both consumers together and verify migration plus application access
aigateway JWT signing secret aigateway token mode and internal auth support Coordinated rotation; not the public edge identity
aigateway admin password Administrative bootstrap Revoke or rotate after authorized use
aigateway provisioning token Profile/credential provisioning Short operational lifetime; rotate or revoke after use
aigateway encryption master key Encrypts provider credentials stored in PostgreSQL Do not rotate in place; use only an application-supported re-encryption migration
Provider credentials Per-user or approved profile records inside aigateway Never place in Helm values or the platform Secret rail; enforce ownership and spend policy
Tunnel token cloudflared connects the dedicated tunnel Rotate through an overlapping tunnel cutover where possible
Cloudflare service identity Non-interactive public checks Provider-managed client credential; rotate/revoke after exposure and verify the replacement
Preview GitHub App private key Argo polls pull requests and reads tenant charts Add a new key, prove PR discovery and Git access, then revoke the old key
Azure federated identity Tenant Actions pushes images to ACR Trust relationship, not a stored Azure client secret; narrow subjects and role scope

Identity is not one credential

The public application path combines distinct controls:

  1. Cloudflare Access authenticates a user or service at the public edge.
  2. Envoy re-verifies the Access assertion and removes forged reserved headers.
  3. Envoy injects the verified identity and platform-owned tenant marker.
  4. url4-cloud issues a separate 60-second capability ticket scoped to one run topic.
  5. aigateway maps a verified user email to an account and selects the requested profile; the profile selects a provider credential.

A capability ticket does not replace Cloudflare identity, and a Cloudflare service identity is not currently a valid aigateway user profile. Treating these as interchangeable can produce a transport-successful request that still cannot execute a model.

Ownership rules

  • PULSE owns Key Vault records, ExternalSecrets, materialized runtime Secrets, and their chart mappings.
  • ScreamingFace owns application behavior that consumes those keys and the schema for profile/provider credentials.
  • Repository-level Azure identifiers are non-secret configuration owned jointly by the tenant CI and platform federation.
  • The tenant application team owns who may receive a provider profile and what spend cap applies. That contract remains an open provider-completion gate.
  • A secret reference may appear in Git; its value may not.

Rotation consequences

Before rotating, identify every consumer, whether overlap is supported, and what constitutes functional proof after cutover. Rotation is not complete because a Secret synchronized or a pod restarted.

Use overlapping-key rotation for systems that support it, including the GitHub App. Use generation-scoped records for application runtime credentials. The aigateway encryption master key is exceptional: replacing it without re-encrypting stored credential blobs makes those blobs unreadable.

Any credential that passes through an uncontrolled channel should be treated as exposed. Revoke or rotate it through the owning provider, then prove the new credential and the old credential's rejection without recording either value.

Source of truth